What the Numbers Wouldn’t Permit: Weighing the Cost Beyond the Price
By Paul C. Udeh
There are moments in the economic development of a nation when the price of building something appears greater than the numbers can justify. The factory is too expensive, the infrastructure requires too much capital, the financing carries an uncomfortable interest rate, the expected return is too distant, and the institutional capacity necessary for implementation remains insufficient. Every calculation appears to advise caution. Yet beyond those calculations lies another cost, one that may be larger, more persistent, and considerably more destructive: the cost of allowing underdevelopment to continue. A road that is not constructed has no immediate construction expense, but the economy continues paying through transportation inefficiencies. A power plant that is not financed creates no immediate debt obligation, but businesses continue paying for unreliable electricity. A technical institution that is not developed requires no additional expenditure, but industries remain constrained by shortages of productive expertise. My argument is that Africa’s economic development may sometimes require decisions that conventional financial calculations cannot immediately justify, because the cost of continued underdevelopment may exceed the price of transformation. The question is not simply how much development costs, but how much more Africa will ultimately pay for failing to develop.
I call this proposition What the Numbers Wouldn’t Permit. It concerns the economic decisions that appear difficult, expensive, or commercially unattractive when evaluated through immediate financial returns but may become strategically necessary when their wider consequences are considered. The proposition is not an invitation to disregard mathematics, abandon financial discipline, or undertake projects that cannot produce defensible economic or social value. Numbers remain indispensable. Interest rates, investment returns, debt-service obligations, opportunity costs, exchange rates, cash flows, and fiscal constraints must be calculated. My concern is that conventional calculations can become incomplete when they measure the immediate expense of action more carefully than the continuing expense of inaction. An investment may fail a narrow commercial test while addressing a structural problem whose economic consequences extend across industries, households, institutions, and future generations.
This distinction connects directly with my earlier argument in Beyond Numerical Value. I maintain that numbers are essential instruments for measuring economic activity, but they do not independently represent the complete productive value of an economy (Udeh, 2026). A government can record an expenditure without fully measuring the capabilities that expenditure establishes. A corporation can calculate the financial cost of acquiring machinery without incorporating every future opportunity that improved production may create. A lender can assess the repayment capacity of an individual project without capturing all the wider economic benefits associated with its completion. The limitation is not necessarily that conventional economics fails to recognize these possibilities. Economic analysis has long examined externalities, social returns, public goods, and opportunity costs. The problem emerges when institutions apply narrow financial measurements to decisions requiring broader developmental evaluation.
The economic cost of development must therefore be understood through two competing possibilities. The first is the cost of undertaking the investment, including capital expenditure, financing, maintenance, implementation risks, and alternative uses of resources. The second is the cost of leaving the existing problem unresolved. A government considering a transport corridor must examine construction and operating costs, but it must also evaluate the continuing cost of freight delays, damaged agricultural products, unreliable supply chains, higher consumer prices, and restricted market access. A manufacturing company considering expansion must examine the required financing, but it should also evaluate the consequences of permanently operating below the scale necessary for competitiveness. These calculations can be uncertain, but uncertainty does not make them irrelevant.
Three interconnected burdens make this issue particularly important for Africa: the cost of competence, the cost of capital, and the cost of corruption. Each raises the price of economic transformation, but each operates through a different mechanism. The cost of competence concerns the knowledge, productive expertise, managerial capability, and institutional effectiveness required to develop and operate economic systems. The cost of capital concerns the financial price of mobilizing resources, including interest rates, debt obligations, currency exposure, and investment risk. The cost of corruption concerns the diversion of resources, distortion of decisions, weakening of institutions, and destruction of confidence through the abuse of entrusted authority. Together, these burdens can cause development to cost substantially more than its underlying productive requirements would otherwise justify.
The first burden begins with competence. It is tempting to describe competence as an individual characteristic, as though economic development merely requires more intelligent or hardworking people. That interpretation is insufficient. Productive competence is also institutional. It includes the capacity to design infrastructure, evaluate investment proposals, manage public procurement, operate factories, develop industrial technologies, coordinate supply chains, maintain equipment, administer regulations, and implement economic policy effectively. An economy may possess capable individuals while lacking the institutions through which their abilities can be organized into sustained production. The developmental cost arises when these weaknesses increase project expenses, reduce productive output, prolong implementation, or prevent valuable economic activity from occurring.
Consider two countries attempting to construct comparable industrial infrastructure. Both may purchase similar materials and employ qualified engineers. Yet one country possesses effective project preparation, transparent procurement, reliable contractors, competent financial management, and institutions capable of resolving implementation difficulties. The other suffers from incomplete designs, weak coordination, inconsistent payments, inadequate supervision, and repeated project modifications. The physical infrastructure may be similar, but the economic resources required to complete it can differ substantially. The price of the project is not merely the price of concrete, steel, machinery, or labour. It also includes the cost of the competence through which those resources are organized.
The International Monetary Fund’s research on public investment management illustrates this distinction. An IMF working paper published in 2024 reported estimated average public-investment efficiency losses of approximately 34 percent across countries, with estimated losses reaching around 53 percent in low-income developing economies (IMF, 2024). These are estimates derived from measures of investment efficiency, not audited evidence that precisely those proportions of budgets were stolen or wasted in cash. Nor do they describe every African country. Their significance lies in demonstrating how institutional weakness can produce substantial differences between public investment expenditure and the infrastructure outcomes achieved. The same money can generate markedly different productive results depending upon how effectively projects are prepared, selected, financed, and implemented.
This creates an uncomfortable developmental contradiction. Countries that most urgently require infrastructure and industrial investment may also face institutional weaknesses that make such investment more expensive. The absence of competence increases the cost of development, while inadequate development can restrict opportunities to acquire competence through practical experience. Engineers require functioning industries in which to develop advanced expertise. Technical institutions require equipment, qualified instructors, and meaningful connections to productive enterprises. Public agencies require professional systems through which planning and implementation capabilities can mature. The nation must invest in competence to reduce the cost of future investment, even when building that competence carries an immediate financial burden.
This is why a purely short-term calculation can underestimate the value of institutional investment. Training engineers, establishing technical laboratories, developing industrial research capabilities, improving procurement systems, and professionalizing public administration may not produce immediate revenues comparable to commercial enterprises. Nevertheless, these expenditures can strengthen the productivity of numerous future investments. A competent institution does not merely complete one project more effectively. It can improve the evaluation, financing, execution, and maintenance of many projects over time. The cost of acquiring competence must therefore be examined against the recurring cost of remaining incompetent.
The second burden is the cost of capital. Africa’s development ambitions require enormous investment in industrial facilities, transportation networks, electricity systems, digital infrastructure, education, healthcare, agriculture, and productive enterprises. Capital is necessary because these assets must often be constructed before their economic benefits become available. But capital is not free. Lenders require compensation for time, inflation, liquidity, and risk. Investors require expected returns that justify committing resources to uncertain ventures. The problem becomes more severe when countries facing substantial development needs must obtain financing on terms that make productive investment difficult to sustain.
The African Development Bank’s African Economic Outlook 2025 reported that interest payments consumed approximately 27.5 percent of government revenues across Africa, compared with 19 percent in 2019 (African Development Bank [AfDB], 2025). This is a continental aggregate and should not be treated as the financial position of every African government. Nevertheless, it reveals a substantial constraint. Revenue devoted to servicing debt cannot simultaneously finance other priorities without additional borrowing, taxation, or expenditure adjustments. The financial cost is measurable, but the developmental cost includes the schools, infrastructure, productive investments, and public services potentially displaced by financing obligations.
The International Energy Agency’s Financing Clean Energy in Africa provides an especially revealing example. The report found that the cost of capital for utility-scale clean electricity generation projects in African markets was at least two to three times higher than in advanced economies and China under the conditions examined (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2023). This matters because electricity infrastructure requires substantial initial capital expenditure, while its productive benefits emerge across many years. Higher financing costs can make otherwise competitive technologies financially unattractive or increase the prices electricity consumers must pay. The manufacturer subsequently encounters higher operating costs, the distributor higher commercial costs, and the household a greater burden on disposable income.
The original cost of capital consequently becomes a cascading economic burden. Expensive financing increases the cost of electricity. Expensive electricity raises the cost of production. Higher production costs weaken industrial competitiveness. Weak industrial competitiveness limits investment returns and discourages expansion. Lower productive capacity sustains dependence upon imported manufactured goods, while continued import requirements can intensify exposure to foreign-exchange pressures. These relationships do not operate identically in every African economy, but they demonstrate why financing costs cannot be evaluated as isolated transactions. The interest rate attached to one infrastructure project can influence the economic viability of enterprises that never directly borrowed the original money.
Foreign-exchange exposure adds another dimension. An African government or company may borrow in dollars or euros while earning most of its revenue in local currency. If the domestic currency depreciates, the local-currency burden of servicing that external debt can increase even when the contractual foreign-currency interest rate remains unchanged. Imported machinery and industrial inputs may also become more expensive. Depreciation can benefit certain exporters whose revenues are denominated in foreign currencies, so its effects are not uniformly negative. Nevertheless, currency mismatch can transform an initially manageable investment into a more difficult financial obligation. The total cost of development must therefore incorporate the interaction between interest rates, repayment currencies, expected revenues, and the economic risks associated with exchange-rate movements.
This is where the proposition What the Numbers Wouldn’t Permit becomes most demanding. Suppose Africa requires a particular industrial investment, but the available financing terms make the project’s immediate private return insufficient. Should the investment be abandoned? Not necessarily. The proper response is to establish whether the project creates wider social and economic benefits that its direct commercial revenues cannot capture. A reliable electricity network may benefit thousands of firms whose increased productivity will not appear as revenue on the network developer’s own financial statements. A transport corridor may connect agricultural producers with distant customers, reducing losses and encouraging commercial activity beyond the operator’s immediate earnings. The existence of such benefits can justify examining alternative financing structures, public participation, or carefully designed concessional support.
But this is not an argument for financing every project regardless of cost. A socially valuable investment can still be poorly designed, mistimed, or excessively expensive. Future benefits must be estimated, discounted appropriately, and compared with realistic alternatives. Debt must remain serviceable, maintenance must be financed, and the economic opportunity costs of using public resources must be considered. The numbers should not be abandoned; they should be made sufficiently comprehensive to measure the decision being considered. Going beyond the numbers cannot mean pretending that debt disappears because a project possesses developmental importance.
The third burden, corruption, introduces a fundamentally different economic cost. Whereas the acquisition of competence and the financing of productive capital may involve necessary expenditure, corruption represents an avoidable distortion of economic activity. Resources intended for productive purposes may be diverted. Contracts may be awarded according to private advantage rather than technical capability. Project specifications may be manipulated, payments inflated, and implementation decisions influenced by interests unrelated to public value. The consequence is not simply that money disappears. Corruption can determine what is built, who builds it, how much it costs, whether it functions, and whether future investors trust the institutions responsible for economic activity.
The IMF’s Fiscal Monitor: Curbing Corruption explains that corruption undermines government revenues, weakens the efficiency of expenditure, and damages the effectiveness of public investment (IMF, 2019). Its analysis also links lower perceived corruption with less waste in public investment. Importantly, inefficient expenditure is not always caused by corruption. Weak project preparation, inadequate professional capacity, and poorly designed institutions can produce similar outcomes without deliberate dishonesty. The distinction matters because effective reform requires identifying the actual problem. Nevertheless, corruption can intensify the economic consequences of incompetence by rewarding those who manipulate systems rather than those who deliver productive results.
Imagine a public infrastructure project whose contract price has been inflated through improper arrangements. The country may borrow to finance that expenditure. Interest is subsequently charged upon the borrowed amount, including the portion that never represented genuine productive value. If construction quality is compromised, maintenance requirements may increase, operational life may shorten, and replacement expenditure may become necessary earlier than expected. The original corruption has therefore produced several economic consequences: unnecessary capital expenditure, additional financing costs, lower infrastructure quality, and future repair obligations. The economy continues paying after the original transaction has ended.
This is where the three costs become interconnected. Incompetence can allow a project to be poorly evaluated. Corruption can distort the selection of contractors or the allocation of funds. Expensive capital can magnify the cost of every unnecessary expenditure. The resulting infrastructure may operate below expectations, weakening the productivity of businesses that depend upon it. Those businesses may generate lower profits, pay less tax, and become less capable of undertaking future investment. The consequences accumulate across economic relationships and across time. What initially appeared to be the cost of one project becomes part of the continuing cost structure of the wider economy.
The World Bank’s World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law provides a broader institutional explanation. It argues that successful policies depend upon credible commitment, coordination, and cooperation, while unequal power, exclusion, and institutional capture can undermine development outcomes (World Bank, 2017). The implication is that even a technically sound economic plan can fail when the institutions responsible for implementing it do not possess the incentives, capacity, or credibility required for effective action. A development strategy cannot therefore be judged solely by the quality of its economic proposal. It must also be judged by the institutional system through which that proposal becomes reality.
This brings me to a distinction that Africa must take seriously: paying more because development requires it is not the same as paying more because the system is inefficient. The first may represent a strategic investment. The second may represent an economic failure. A government may rationally finance expensive technical training because the capability developed will benefit future industries. It may accept a carefully evaluated financial burden to construct essential infrastructure that generates large social returns. It may invest in research whose commercial applications remain uncertain but whose wider benefits are credible. These decisions can involve genuine sacrifice. By contrast, paying inflated contract prices, financing avoidable delays, tolerating corruption, or repeatedly rebuilding defective infrastructure should not be celebrated as going the extra mile.
The distinction is especially important because development cannot be justified through ambition alone. A nation may declare that a project is essential, that the economic future depends upon it, or that history will eventually vindicate the decision. Such arguments may be sincere, but they do not eliminate the responsibility to evaluate evidence. Some investments genuinely transform productive systems. Others become expensive monuments to mistaken assumptions. Economic development demands a willingness to undertake necessary costs while maintaining the intellectual discipline to reject expenditures that cannot be defended. The greater the national sacrifice required, the stronger the obligation to demonstrate why that sacrifice is justified.
Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (2005) developed a growth-diagnostics framework emphasizing the identification of the most binding constraints to economic growth. Their approach recognizes that countries face different barriers and that reforms should concentrate upon constraints whose removal offers the greatest potential economic benefit. Rodrik (2010) subsequently emphasized that effective development policy requires diagnosis suited to national circumstances rather than the mechanical application of universal prescriptions. This reasoning strengthens my argument because it introduces a necessary qualification: Africa should not automatically spend more everywhere. It should identify where additional expenditure, institutional reform, or strategic investment will remove the restrictions most responsible for suppressing productive activity.
A country facing severe electricity constraints may generate greater economic benefits from improving power supply than from undertaking another highly visible but weakly connected public project. Another economy may possess infrastructure but struggle because financial markets cannot mobilize sufficient long-term capital. A third may require stronger technical education, contract enforcement, or trade logistics. The relevant developmental calculation must reflect these differences. What the numbers appear not to permit may be justified only after the underlying economic problem has been diagnosed and the expected benefits have been examined.
This is why the meaning of going the extra mile should be reconsidered. It is not simply the willingness to pay a higher price. It is the willingness to undertake the difficult work necessary to transform an expensive economic environment into a more productive one. Sometimes that requires additional capital. Sometimes it requires institutional reform, technical training, better management, greater transparency, or the courage to discontinue a failing project. A government that spends more without improving productive capability has not necessarily advanced development. A government that strengthens institutions and reduces avoidable costs may generate substantial progress without increasing expenditure proportionately.
The deeper problem is that underdevelopment has its own compounding consequences. Inadequate infrastructure raises business costs. High business costs discourage investment. Weak investment limits employment and incomes. Low incomes constrain savings and domestic capital formation. Limited capital formation can reinforce dependence upon expensive financing. Institutional weaknesses undermine confidence, while corruption can increase the effective cost of doing business. The economy becomes trapped in a relationship where existing weaknesses make improvement expensive, and delayed improvement allows those weaknesses to persist.
Breaking this relationship may require investments whose benefits cannot be captured within the time horizon of a single government, enterprise, or financial institution. A technical university may develop engineers whose productive contributions emerge decades later. An industrial transport system may become more valuable as surrounding businesses expand. A research institution may generate knowledge that supports industries not yet established. These possibilities must not be treated as guaranteed returns, but neither should they be excluded merely because their benefits are difficult to monetize immediately. Developmental judgment requires assessing the distribution of costs and benefits across institutions, industries, households, and generations.
Africa must also confront the tension between present sacrifice and future capability. Every resource committed to a development project becomes unavailable for another immediate purpose. A government borrowing for infrastructure may face greater fiscal pressure. A business investing in advanced machinery may temporarily reduce liquidity. A country providing targeted support to an emerging industry may sacrifice revenue that could finance other services. These trade-offs are real. The responsibility is to ensure that the expected future capability justifies the present sacrifice and that the burden is distributed in a financially and socially sustainable manner.
This is where leadership, investment management, and institutional discipline become inseparable. Africa does not simply require leaders willing to approve expensive projects. It requires institutions capable of distinguishing productive sacrifice from financial recklessness. It requires financial systems that can structure capital according to the economic lives of productive assets. It requires businesses that understand productivity rather than merely revenue. It requires transparent public investment management, competent procurement, credible project evaluation, and mechanisms for determining whether expected benefits have materialized.
The principle also applies to private enterprises. An African manufacturer may need to pay more today to acquire machinery capable of reducing production costs tomorrow. A business may need to spend substantially on training before its workforce reaches the productivity required for expansion. An entrepreneur may need to accept lower immediate margins to build supplier relationships, establish quality standards, or enter a competitive market. These decisions can make economic sense when they develop capabilities whose expected value exceeds their cost. But accepting lower returns without a defensible pathway toward future value is not strategy. It is merely sacrifice without sufficient economic direction.
The challenge is therefore to distinguish the cost Africa must bear from the cost Africa should eliminate. The cost of competence may require deliberate investment in knowledge, institutions, technology, and professional capability. The cost of capital requires better financial structures, stronger economic credibility, and financing arrangements compatible with productive development. The cost of corruption requires prevention, accountability, transparency, and the protection of public resources. These burdens should not be managed as isolated problems. They interact within the same productive economy and influence the financial viability of national transformation.
What the Numbers Wouldn’t Permit is ultimately an argument about weighing the cost beyond the price. It asks whether the immediate expenditure being rejected is more expensive than the economic condition being preserved. It challenges governments, businesses, and financial institutions to examine both visible obligations and the productive opportunities lost through inaction. It recognizes that some developments require paying more than would be necessary in a more capable economy, while insisting that the avoidable portion of that additional cost must not be mistaken for development itself.
Africa must not become so frightened by the price of transformation that it accepts the permanent cost of underdevelopment. Neither should it become so determined to develop that it abandons the financial and institutional discipline necessary to make development sustainable. The continent requires both courage and calculation. Courage to undertake productive investments whose benefits extend beyond immediate returns, and calculation to distinguish necessary sacrifice from incompetence, corruption, and unsustainable debt.
The most expensive decision is not always the one requiring the greatest immediate expenditure. Sometimes it is the decision that appears financially comfortable because its consequences are postponed. The factory remains unbuilt, the infrastructure remains inadequate, the workforce remains underutilized, and the economy continues paying through lost production, missed opportunities, weak competitiveness, and restricted economic capacity.
The true cost of development is not simply what Africa must pay to build its future. It is also what Africa continues to pay for the future it has not built.
That is what the numbers would not always permit us to see. And it is why Africa must learn to calculate not merely the price of transformation, but the greater economic cost of postponing it.
References
African Development Bank. (2025). African economic outlook 2025. https://www.afdb.org/en/knowledge/publications/african-economic-outlook
Hausmann, R., Rodrik, D., & Velasco, A. (2005). Growth diagnostics. Harvard University. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/growth-diagnostics.pdf
International Energy Agency. (2023). Financing clean energy in Africa. https://www.iea.org/reports/financing-clean-energy-in-africa
International Monetary Fund. (2019). Fiscal monitor, April 2019: Curbing corruption. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781498302180.089
International Monetary Fund. (2024). Public investment management bottlenecks in low-income countries (IMF Working Paper No. 2024/232). https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2024/english/wpiea2024232-print-pdf.pdf
Rodrik, D. (2010). Diagnostics before prescription. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(3), 33–44. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.24.3.33
Udeh, P. C. (2026). Beyond numerical value. Paul C. Udeh. https://news.paulcudeh.com/beyond-numerical-value/
World Bank. (2017). World development report 2017: Governance and the law. https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017



